The Defense Department is replacing Gen. David McKiernan as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan today; his replacement will be Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who ran special operations in Iraq under Gen. David Petraeus and saw successes in the 2007 troop surge.
So why is McKiernan out?
According to defense officials who spoke to The New York Times, it's because they saw McKiernan as runnng too conventional of a campaign in Afghanistan. McChrystal, with special ops and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism experience, comes from a less conventional branch of the military.
Afghanistan experts I talked to said that things just aren't going that well in Afghanistan and that the administration wanted to see some results. If the administration's new model for Afghanistan focuses more heavily on counterterrorism than counterinsurgency, as Obama's new comprehensive policy suggested, McChrystal's special ops experience seems to fit with that goal.
It's also possible that Gen. David Petraeus wanted someone who could bring experience with the Iraq troop surge directly to bear on Afghanistan. If the U.S. military wants to translate what it's learned in Iraq about fighting a guerilla war against muslim extremists, McChrystal's work in Iraq might be a more direct attempt to do that. McKiernan led the effort to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq; McChrystal was an integral part of the phase the Obama administration now wants to emulate.
McKiernan, who already served as NATO commander in Afghanistan, took control of U.S. forces in 2008. Three different overarching command structures were involved in the Afghanistan effort, and as commander, McKiernan would have had to report to all three CENTCOM (Central Command), EUCOM (European Command), and SOCOM (Special Operations Command).
"[McKiernan] found this disjointed command structure very problematic," one expert told me. "He's a military guy, and he'll say, 'Well, we do the best with what we're given.'"
Observers have congratulated Petraeus on his ability to slice through military bureaucracy (though much of this has had to do with his ability to reach down into the chain of command to subordinates); it's possible Petraeus wanted someone who could better deal with a complicated command structure.
The transition to McChrystal could also have to do with the envisioned timeline for U.S. involvement there. McKiernan has historically asked for more troops to be sent to Afghanistan, and he indicated in February that the 17,000 additional U.S. troops recently sent to Afghanistan could stay there as long as five years; that's a long-term presence the Obama administration might want to avoid--or at least appear as if it's trying to avoid--especially as it begins to feel some pressure from Congress to keep U.S. involvement there as brief as possible.
Today's surprise move, at the very least, signals that the administration wants to take control of the situation in Afghanistan. Appointing someone with special ops background gives the appearance of a sleeker operation, more committed to the counterterrorism mission than to long, drawn-out conventional warfare, at least in the public eye. Whether this will change things in Afghanistan, or whether the effect will be limited to these cosmetics, has of course yet to be seen.
Counter-insurgency. The strategy up to now has not been CounterInsurgency. Apparently McChrystal is associated with the 'surge' and that was a successful CoIn campaign. One thing to look for: Airstrikes. A rule of thumb is that if you are calling in airstrikes, you are losing a guerrilla was.
Mr. Good, think a moment about what you are saying in the last three lines of your post: "...more committed to the counterterrorism mission than to LONG, DRAWN-OUT CONVENTIONAL WARFARE..." Are you kidding? The essence of smart, strategic C/T policy is to be PATIENT, making it perfectly clear to enemies and allies that the super-power so engaged is in it for the long haul. If there is any hint that operational or policy changes, such as replacing a commander, have been undertaken because the political authorities are acting out of impatience, then that is the kiss of death. The Afghan government, critics and rivals waiting in the wings, the war-lords, the drug-smugglers, the various ethnic and tribal factions, the fence-sitting sort-of Taliban, the lukewarm supporters of the government, any remnants of civil society, the Pakistanis...all of these players are sensitive to cues coming from Washington that indicate impatience there with the mission, and all of the relevant actors will react according to their private calculations of how to best position themseves for maximum advantage when the Americans leave. We can only hope that this commander replacement business has taken those fundamental realities into account or the Afghanistan strategy is on the fast track to failure.